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P.: Municipal Corporations--Duty to Remove Snow and Ice from Sidewalk

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
to surrender the premises and equipment to C was entirely consistent with the interest which C still had in the term. True, the
equipment and machinery had been removed long before the lease
expired, but construing the instrument as of the time when the
lease was made, it appears that the court was correct in holding it
to be a sublease.
L. L. P.
MUNICIPAL CopoPRAroNs-DuTry To REMOVE SNOW AND ICE
FRoM SDEwALKs-LA BILI
OF ABUTTING OwNERs Am OccuPANTS.-

Action by a pedestrian against a city, the owner of a building, and a
tenant of the building for personal injuries suffered in a fall on an
icy sidewalk along the side of the building. The defendants demurred to the declaration separately. The tenant's demurrer was
sustained while the demurrers of the owner and city were overruled. Held, that under a valid ordinance requiring the owner and
occupant to remove snow and ice from the sidewalks fronting the
premises, the owner who occupied a part of the upper floor as an
office to which people using the sidewalk along the side of the
building had access, was liable for failure to remove snow and ice
as required. The tenant was not liable for failure to comply with
the ordinance. The city was liable under W. VA. CODE c. 17, art. 10,
§ 17 (Michie 1955), for permitting the sidewalks to remain in a
state of disrepair. Rulings affirmed. Barniakv. Grossman,93 S.E.2d
49 (W. Va. 1956).
Under common law, generally a municipality was liable for
injuries resulting from disrepair of streets and sidewalks. CooL=Y,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF MuNIciPAL CoPOIIRAToONs 387 (1914).
See, e.g., Childersv. Deschamps,87 Mont. 505, 290 Pac. 261 (1930).
This rule remains unchanged, unless the state has relieved the
municipal corporation of such responsibility. Wilson v. City of
Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 323, 42 Am. Rep. 780 (1882). The West Virginia legislature has reaffirmed the common law liability in cases
where the municipal corporation, by its own charter, is required to
keep streets and sidewalks in repair. W. VA. CODE c. 17, art. 10, § 17,
supra. For further comment on the liability of municipal corporations in West Virginia, see Note, 53 W. VA. L. REv. 89 (1951).
The heart of this case, and a highly controversial point, concerns
the civil liability of the property owners and occupants for failure
to remove free fallen snow from sidewalks as required by an ordi-
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nance. Under common law, the failure on the part of abutting property owners and occupants to abate such a hazard as this has never
been a ground for damages resulting from the inaction. Courts have
reasoned that free fallen snow is a hazard created by nature and the
owners and occupants are under no duty to prevent or correct natural
hazards. 6 McQumLAN, MuNicirPAL CoRoRATIONS § 22.12 (3d ed.
1949).
However, the West Virginia court has placed liability for these
injuries squarely on the property owners and occupants, on the basis
of snow and ice removal ordinances, by holding that "violation of
an ordinance is prima facie actionable negligence when it is the
proximate cause of an injury." Barniak v. Grossman, supra. The
court in the Barniak case relied on Rich v. Rosenshine, 131 W. Va.
80, 45 S.E.2d 499 (1947), which involved a similar set of facts. The
Rich case was the first of this nature and was followed by Morris v.
City of Wheeling, 82 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1954). The liability of
abutting owners and occupants was in the nature of dictum in the
Morris case, since the jury found no negligence by the property
owner. These cases, in construing the ordinances, therefore change
the existing common law rule.
Municipal ordinances must be based on a statute to be given
judicial notice by the courts. Boyland v. City of Parkersburg, 78
W. Va. 749, 90 S.E. 347 (1916). The intent of the statute or charter
of incorporation, giving the municipal corporation the authority to
pass ordinances, must be followed, i.e., it must give the authority to
annex civil liability. BisHop, CoNnm=rAan s oN THE LAw OF
CmnFis § 22 (2d ed. 1883); Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R.I. 456, 23 Am.
Rep. 502 (1877). The charter of incorporation of the city of Fairmont, which gives it the authority to pass this ordinance, also gives
it the power to impose a penalty for its violation, but nowhere in
this authority has it been given the right to create civil liability for
failure to comply with the ordinance. W. Va. Acts 1919, c. 22, §§ 5,
78, 74, and 152. Quaere, has this authority been exceeded?
The principal case, as well as the Rich case, supra, cited numerous West Virginia cases as authority for the proposition that violation of an ordinance is prima facie actionable negligence. However,
none of those cited involved snow and ice removal ordinances but
were concerned with dangerous instrumentalities as affecting a
specified group; e.g., automobiles, machinery, minimum age of
employment, etc.
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Who did the legislature, in giving this authority, intend to protect-the public as such or the public as composed of individuals?
The breach of a duty, imposed by an ordinance, which is owed to
individuals gives rise to civil liability, but this is not true where the
ordinance is meant to protect the public in general. The court in
the principal case failed to differentiate between these two concepts,
which in the writer's opinion is of paramount importance. The
majority of cases in the United States hold that the duty is owed
to the municipal corporation and that the abutting owners and
occupants cannot be made liable to individuals for injuries as a
result of failure to comply with the ordinance. For an accumulation
of these cases, see Annot. 24 A.L.R. 387 (1923).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, by creating this
new liability, has done that which few other courts of our land have
deemed necessary. As our country grows and society becomes more
complex, certain steps need to be taken to insure the safety of the
public against injuries of this nature. The desirable attributes of
these measures must be weighed against the burdens they create,
and the burden of constant surveillance or increased liability insurance on the owners and occupants may greatly outweigh the
benefits so gained.
I. A. P., Jr.
NuisANcE-AEsrarIc GR ONDS H=L VALID FOR INJUNCTIv
REE AGAINST LAWFUL Busnmss.-Ds operated and maintained a
used automobile sales business located on their land, outside the
corporate limits of a city, not subject to zoning regulations or restrictive covenants; situated, however, across a major highway from a
theretofore exclusively residential area within the corporate limits.
Ps sued to enjoin Ds on the grounds that the business constituted a
nuisance per accidens or in fact, because of excessive lighting, noise,
unsightliness, and diminution of value of Ps"property. Held, affirming the circuit court's decree, that Ds shall remove from their land
all automobiles, trucks, light poles, wires, lights, equipment, installations and structures used by them in the conduct of the used car
business. Martin v. Williams, 93 S.E.2d 835 (W. Va. 1956) (8-2
decision).
An examination of the facts in the opinion indicates the insufficiency of the other alleged grounds for relief, and reveals the apparent conclusion that the aesthetic argument was the major
consideration relied upon by the court in reaching its decision. If it
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